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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
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Visit of a Russian epidemiologist

1. On 12 May 1953, the Central Serum Testing Institute, Berlin-Pankow, Wollankstrasse 16, was visited by an epidemiologist from the Soviet Control Commission in Berlin-Karlshorst whose name was Senior Lieutenant Agarov (fmu). He had slight curvature of the spine. He seemed to be more of an administrator than a scientist.
2. Agarov inspected the whole Institute. He then made the following comments and suggestions:
 - a. There were too few security precautions. Thieves, saboteurs and even agents could too easily get into the Institute. He therefore arranged for bars to be put on the outside windows and for two watchmen to be hired.
 - b. The rooms were too few and too small for the work. He wanted a separate isolated room for each test. He did not appear to understand, in this connection, much about the tests. There will be no enlargement of the Institute.

Independence from the West

3. On 20 May 1953, the Institute was able to report that it had, for several weeks, been testing all serums and vaccines

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Supply situation

4. In May 1953, test chemicals and standard chemicals were in abundant supply.
5. The shortages of Seitz filters and the poor quality of cannulae and syringes were causing difficulties.

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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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Peculiar circumstances surrounding recent supplies of serums and vaccines.

6. The following facts have recently become known to the East German Central Serum Testing Institute.

a. The vaccine producing center in Berlin 9., 24 Thaerstrasse, has been, for a month or two at least, producing a large quantity of dried lymph (Trockenlymph), far in excess of East Germany's domestic needs. Shortly before 6 June 1953, a politically trusted employee of the center (Wirk (fmu), SED member) brought samples of charges (Chargen) of the dried lymph to the Central Serum Testing Institute. He treated the matter as very important and asked for the quickest and most careful examination of the material. He said that the charges were for the USSR.

b. Shortly before 6 June 1953, the Central Serum Testing Institute

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an accelerated testing of the Vaccinneurin held by the Institute, because of delivery to the USSR in advance of the established date. It was known in the Institute that the vaccines in question had not been earmarked for export deliveries, but for production on the orders of the East German State Administration of the National Reserve.

c. In early June, the Impfstoffwerk Schoeneweide (Berlin-Niederschoeneweide, Koellnische Strasse) had large orders for virus influenza (Grippe) serum and typhus serum. Products in partial fulfillment of these orders (for the East German State Administration of the National Reserve) were collected by officials who neither gave their names nor showed their identity papers (presumably State Security Service (SSD) officials).¹

d. On 1 or 2 June 1953, a messenger brought samples of diphtheria serum from Phylaxia, Budapest, to the Central Serum Testing Institute.

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20,000 I.U. 10.5 cc concentrated and purified diphtheria serum from horses. Expiration date: 31 December 1954. The printed label on the box was in English; a further typed German label had been added. The messenger had come via the Ministry of Health. He refused to give his name, show his papers, or say in what connection he had come. He merely asked that the samples be tested for toxicity, sterility and value. His right to ask this was confirmed by the Ministry when they were telephoned about the matter. The Institute concluded that the messenger was a member of the State Security Service.

e. There was a plan some time ago for a supply of serums and vaccines to be stored by DHZ Pharmazie Berlin, as a national reserve. This has not taken place and does not now seem to be under consideration.

7. The interpretation put upon the above facts by the Central Serum Testing Institute is that the supplies were in each case for the USSR. The Institute further thinks that the East German Reserve is perhaps to be set up in the USSR.

8. In early June 1953, the bus and trailer, prepared by Professor Karl Walther as a mobile field bacteriological laboratory for the National Army, were at Ilmenau, Thuringia. They were visited by Frl. Amon (fmu) (who has been training at the Central Serum Testing Institute). Frl. Amon, who is to work with this installation, found that the heavy furniture of the bus was unsuitable and that most of the laboratory equipment was still lacking. She ordered certain alterations and reported to the Central Serum Institute later that the installation would not be ready before about the middle of September or beginning of October.²

1. Comment: Although it is true that State Security officials are apt to behave as described, not giving names or showing identity papers, it is not a fair inference that because a man does this, he must be SSD. This behaviour can be noted on any operation which is to be kept very secret - e.g. once when a party of Germans bound for Korea came to the Ministry of Health, the members of the party refused to give their names or show any papers.

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